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Abstract
In the last eighteen months of his life Dag Hammarskjöld was taken up with two 
major African issues, the Congo and South Africa. In the Congo he organised a 
United Nations (UN) mission to stabilise the country as it threatened to collapse 
into chaos following decolonisation; in South Africa he tried to deal with the 
conflict situation after the Sharpeville massacre by engaging in discussions 
with the South African Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd. For that purpose 
he made a long-delayed visit to South Africa in January 1961. What did he try 
to achieve through his contacts with the South African government, and what 
other significance did his visit have for the unfolding history of apartheid and 
the struggle against it? This paper will focus on these questions, while a more 
substantial version, with detailed references to the sources upon which it is 
based, will be presented to the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in mid-2011 as 
part of the commemorations marking fifty years since Hammarskjöld’s death.
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From soon after he became Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in 
1953, Hammarskjöld had to deal with Southern African issues, but they did not 
loom large before 1960. Throughout the 1950s there was the mounting criticism 
at the UN of South Africa’s apartheid policy and a UN Commission on the Racial 
Situation in the Union of South Africa (UNCORS) much annoyed the South 
African government, which kept repeating its claim that the UN had no role to 
play, because apartheid was a domestic affair and article 2 in chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter said that nothing in the Charter ‘shall authorise the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state’ (United Nations 1945:5). Also in the 1950s there was a growing campaign 
at the UN to challenge South Africa’s occupation of its de facto colony of South 
West Africa, where it was implementing apartheid policies. From the late 1940s 
the Herero people of that territory had, through their Chiefs’ Council, been 
petitioning the UN and asking that the UN should take over the mandate role of 
the League of Nations and end South African rule of South West Africa. By the 
end of the 1950s, thanks in part to the advocacy work of the Reverend Michael 
Scott, long-time petitioner at the UN, a case was being brought before the 
International Court on this issue (Saunders 2007; Irwin 2010). After the police 
shooting in Windhoek, the capital of South West Africa, in December that year, 
in which twelve unarmed protestors were killed, the South African government 
hinted that it would not welcome the UN Secretary-General making a visit to 
South West Africa, but nothing came of the idea that he would visit Southern 
Africa at that time. When later UN Secretaries-General visited Southern Africa, 
they did so chiefly in relation to the Namibian issue – Dr Kurt Waldheim in 1972 
and Pérez de Cuéllar in 1982 (Du Pisani 1985:217; De Cuéllar 1997).
It was the apartheid issue, as a conflict situation of potential international 
significance, that took Hammarskjöld to South Africa. His visit followed 
another police shooting – this time of unarmed protestors against the pass laws 
at Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg, on 21 March 1960 – and on the same 
day yet another shooting in the township of Langa outside Cape Town. Until 
this time, neither the apartheid issue nor that of South West Africa had been 
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taken to the UN Security Council, but after the Sharpeville massacre, and as 
further violence and unrest followed, a group of African and Asian members of 
the UN urgently requested the Council to consider the matter, as having ‘grave 
potentialities for international friction, which endangers the maintenance of 
international peace and security’ (United Nations 1994:244). As the Council 
discussed an appropriate resolution to indicate the world body’s abhorrence 
at what apartheid meant, the South African government declared a state of 
emergency on 30 March. Two days later (critics of the UN in South Africa were 
quick to point out that it was April Fool’s day) the Council, by nine votes to 
none, with two abstentions, adopted resolution 134, which deplored ‘the policies 
and actions of the Government of the Union of South Africa which have given 
rise to the present situation’, called upon that government ‘to initiate measures 
aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality…and to abandon 
its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination’, and requested the Secretary-
General, ‘in consultation with the Government of the Union of South Africa, to 
make such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes 
and principles of the Charter and to report to the Security Council whenever 
necessary and appropriate’ (United Nations 1994:244–245).
This was a relatively mild, compromise resolution. The United States Embassy in 
South Africa reported that it came ‘as a relief ’ to the government there, leaving 
it ‘with the impression that they need not fear any real difficulty from U.N. side 
and that the old policies could be pursued without serious consequences from 
abroad’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). The representative of the only African country 
on the Council at the time, Tunisia, said he had expected ‘a great deal more’, while 
France and Britain abstained because they thought the resolution went beyond 
what the Charter permitted. That was also the line taken by the permanent 
South African representative to the UN, Bernardus (Brand) Fourie, when he 
addressed the Council, though Fourie also went on to say that if there was any 
further bloodshed in South Africa, the Security Council would have to accept 
its share of responsibility! The American representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
chair of the Council, said that the resolution was designed to build a bridge, 
not a wall, between the UN and South Africa, while the Soviet representative 
made it clear that, while he would vote for the resolution, the Soviet Union 
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would have preferred one that did not transfer responsibility from the Council 
to the Secretary-General and one that would have asked the Secretary-General 
to observe and report, not consult with the apartheid government. Others who 
spoke on the resolution, however, said that they trusted the ‘political acumen’ of 
the Secretary-General and thought the resolution was admirably non-specific 
in not laying out the precise steps that the Secretary-General should take 
(New York Times 2 April 1960). Those who were to criticise the vagueness of the 
resolution were to point out that it did not make clear, for example, whether, if 
the Secretary-General were to visit South Africa, he would merely speak to the 
South African government, or whether he should also consult more widely and 
gather information on the South African situation for the UN (e.g. Cape Times 
9 January 1961).
Among the key hurdles initially facing Hammarskjöld were whether the South 
African government would see a visit by him as interference in its domestic 
affairs, and, if a visit took place, who, besides the government, Hammarskjöld 
would see. When he met the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, in 
April, a few days after the African National Congress (ANC), along with the 
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which had organised the demonstrations on 
21 March, had been banned, the two men agreed that ‘the necessary change’ in 
South Africa ‘can only come from within’, and that meant change from within 
the government, for there was no realistic likelihood of the government being 
overthrown by internal resistance. After the Sharpeville massacre a number 
of prominent people, including the Minister of Lands, Paul Sauer, called for a 
change in racial policy away from a rigid application of apartheid laws. Taking 
up the idea of exploiting divisions in South Africa’s ruling elite, Hammarskjöld 
suggested to Selwyn Lloyd that ‘pressure should be maintained in support of 
the moderates, but in such a form as not to lead to any international showdown 
with ensuring entrenchment of the diehards in their positions, before a counter-
balancing influence within the Union can have made itself felt’ (Hammarskjöld 
Papers). If the South African government did not allow him to visit – and this was 
by no means certain; Hungary had refused to allow him to visit after the events 
of 1956 – he anticipated that his report to the Security Council ‘undoubtedly 
would provoke an immediate Security Council meeting likely to decide at least 
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on withdrawal of [South African] diplomatic representation’ (Hammarskjöld 
Papers). While the African and Asian countries at the UN probably hoped that 
he would be refused entry, and that such a refusal would help their case for the 
imposition of economic sanctions by the UN against the apartheid regime, the 
British government urged the South African government to agree to the visit, 
and Eric Louw, South Africa’s Minister for External Affairs, soon issued a formal 
invitation to him to visit, with the proviso that such a visit ‘did not imply any 
recognition by the Union government of UN authority in relation to South 
Africa’s domestic affairs’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). 
While the post-Sharpeville mood probably influenced the decision to allow 
Hammarskjöld to visit, the South African government of course realised that 
allowing him to visit would end any possibility of any immediate further action 
against South Africa by the UN Security Council. In an interim report to the 
Council on 19 April, Hammarskjöld informed it that he would go to London 
to meet Louw after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in May 
(and he would have met Prime Minister Verwoerd there as well, had he not been 
recovering from having been shot in the head in an attempted assassination), 
and that ‘It is agreed between the Government of the Union of South Africa and 
myself that consent of the Union Government to discuss the Security Council’s 
resolution with the Secretary-General would not require prior recognition 
from the Union Government of the United Nations authority’ (United Nations 
Security Council 1960). The South African government told Hammarskjöld 
that it would be best to defer his proposed visit until the judicial commissions 
into the shootings at Sharpeville and Langa on 21 March had submitted their 
reports, and when he met Louw at South Africa House in London on 13 and 
14 May, the two men agreed that he would visit in July 1960, after which he 
planned to report back to the Security Council before the annual UN General 
Assembly session beginning in September. Hammarskjöld reported to Selwyn 
Lloyd that ‘the discussions with Mr Louw turned out surprisingly well, and the 
road is paved to Pretoria, not only through good intentions, but, I hope, also by 




Before he met Louw in London, four leading members of the resistance in 
South Africa then in London, including Oliver Tambo of the ANC and two 
representatives of the PAC, asked Hammarskjöld for a meeting. They wanted 
him to insist that when he visited South Africa he should talk to Chief Albert 
Luthuli, the President-General of the ANC, and Robert Sobukwe, President of 
the PAC, though the former was banned and restricted and the latter was in 
jail (Hammarskjöld Papers). Hammarskjöld did not meet the four, but did ask 
Louw for ‘free access to such non-governmental persons as it might be useful 
for him to see’. Louw said there would be no strings attached to his visit, but 
pointed to certain ‘risks and possible objections against other contacts’, to 
which Hammarskjöld replied that contacts ‘with any specific people or groups 
would have to be decided upon as the means to an end’ and such a decision 
‘was a question of “wisdom” which it was no use to discuss at the present stage’ 
(Hammarskjöld Papers). When a tentative schedule was then drawn up for the 
visit, it provided for a ten day visit that took him to Johannesburg for ‘discussion 
with representative Africans’ on day four, to Cape Town on day five, where he 
would have ‘discussion with representatives of “Cape Coloureds”’, to Umtata and 
to Durban, where he would have ‘discussions with representatives of Africans 
and Indians’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). When Hammarskjöld approved this, 
‘subject to adjustments which can only be made on the spot’ (Hammarskjöld 
Papers), he did not anticipate that from the beginning of July he would become 
almost entirely consumed with the Congo issue.
In July 1960, as the date of his visit approached, concerns began to be expressed 
in South Africa that he should not only talk to the government and those black 
leaders whom the government might want him to meet. Alan Paton, chairman 
of the non-racial Liberal Party, issued a statement calling for him to meet people 
across the political spectrum, and Paton wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt in New York 
to ask her to use her influence to ensure that this happened (Hammarskjöld 
Papers). At a meeting in the City Hall in Cape Town a Liberal Party spokesperson 
claimed that there was ‘intense interest’ by Africans in the forthcoming visit, and 
the Cape Times stressed the importance of Hammarskjöld getting ‘a balanced 
picture’ by meeting other than government people (Cape Times 26 July and 
2 August 1960). The South African Indian Congress and the Congress of 
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Democrats urged him to meet ‘representative leaders’, mentioning Luthuli 
in particular, and Duma Nokwe, Secretary-General of the banned ANC and 
a lawyer, wrote to Hammarskjöld from Pretoria Central prison, where he 
was detained, to appeal to him to meet Luthuli (Reddy Papers). Though the 
PAC leadership within the country was silent on Hammarskjöld’s visit, from 
Windhoek in South West Africa, Uatja Kaukuetu, the acting President-General 
of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), which like the PAC had 
been formed the previous year, asked for an interview with Hammarskjöld, 
presumably expecting him to visit South West Africa. Kaukuetu claimed that 
SWANU represented ‘by far the greater majority of the total population of 
the territory’ and said that it could explain apartheid and its impact to him. 
Moreover, his statement continued, such a meeting would enhance the prestige 
of the UN, for, referring to the Herero petitions, it would ‘obviate suspicion on 
the part of those who have called on the United Nations for the past 13 years’ 
(Cape Times 29 July 1960; cf. Sellström 1999:142–143). 
But Hammarskjöld was not to visit anywhere in the region in 1960, for from 
early July the Congo crisis became his chief priority, and it was first announced 
that his visit to South Africa would be shortened, so that he would only meet 
the government, then that his visit would be postponed until late August or 
early September, and then, when he had to return to UN headquarters in New 
York to report on the Congo, that it would not take place at all at that time 
(Hammarskjöld Papers). All he could report to the UN Security Council on 
11 October was that he had had another meeting with Louw at UN headquarters 
in New York on 28 September, that Louw had issued a new invitation to him 
to visit, and that he now planned to undertake the visit in January 1961. His 
interim report added that ‘during the contemplated visit to the Union of South 
Africa, while consultation throughout would be with the Union Government, no 
restrictive rules were to be imposed on the Secretary-General’ (United Nations 
Security Council 1960). 
This lengthy delay meant that by the time he did visit, the post-Sharpeville crisis in 
South Africa had abated, the ruling white minority had recovered its confidence 
– in part thanks to Verwoerd’s ‘miraculous’ recovery – and talk of any relaxation 
in apartheid had disappeared. Also, the urgency expressed by the African and 
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Asian countries at the UN to tackle the South African conflict had faded. On the 
other hand, during the intervening months many more independent African 
countries had become members of the UN, and Hammarskjöld knew that their 
presence would mean that the campaign against apartheid at the UN was likely 
to grow more intense in the future. The question in 1960–61 seemed to many to 
be whether South Africa would follow other African countries and ‘decolonise’ 
in some form, which would mean abandoning apartheid and perhaps accepting 
some form of power-sharing, for the idea that the ruling white minority would 
lose all political power seemed far-fetched to most, though some thought it 
possible. For South Africa’s ruling white elite, however, their country was quite 
different from the rest of Africa, and there was no question of them following 
the route to black majority rule. As we will see, this was the argument that was 
put forcefully by Verwoerd in his talks with Hammarskjöld.
The visit 
Hammarskjöld’s visit did not begin well. When he disembarked at Leopoldville 
in the Congo from the Pan American Airlines DC8 that had taken him there 
from New York, certain ‘important’ documents relating to his visit to South 
Africa were found to be missing. At Jan Smuts airport outside Johannesburg 
Pan American staff searched the plane, but did not find the documents, which, 
it was reported at the time, another passenger had picked up (New York Times 
6 January 1961). These documents may have included the lengthy briefing 
papers on South Africa that had been prepared for him at UN headquarters 
the previous April and May. He had then also read Leo Marquard’s The peoples 
and policies of South Africa, which he called a ‘sober and for that reason all 
the more appalling analysis of the South African problem’ (Hammarskjöld 
Papers). Though the problems of the Congo must have remained in his mind 
throughout his South African visit, Hammarskjöld was clearly well-prepared for 
his discussions with Verwoerd. His chief African adviser, Heinrich Wieschhoff, 
an American of German origin, knew South Africa well, having lived in Pretoria 
before the Second World War, where he had continued his studies at the local 
university. Wieschhoff accompanied Hammarskjöld throughout his visit and 
Hammarskjöld relied on him for advice on where to go and what to see.
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When Hammarskjöld flew into South Africa, his plane was at the last minute 
instructed to land at the state airfield at Waterkloof and not at the main 
commercial airport of Johannesburg, Jan Smuts, where a group of demonstrators 
had gathered. He was therefore welcomed initially only by some government 
officials and a few journalists, but by the time he reached his hotel in Pretoria, 
there were about 300 ‘Africans, Indians, half-castes and a few whites’ there to 
greet him with the thumbs up sign of the Congress Alliance, formed in the 
mid-1950s of the main anti-apartheid movements and led by the ANC. They 
sang the anthem of the ANC, ‘Nkosi sikelel’ iAfrika’, and held up placards that 
read, inter alia, ‘Welcome to our Police State’, ‘Dag: Take the Yokes off our Neck’, 
‘Dag Baas (Good day, Master) – where is your pass?’, ‘Meet Non-white leaders’, 
‘Don’t forget Sharpeville’, ‘Dag: visit Pondoland’ and ‘We want Human Rights, 
Higher Wages’. One of the group tried to present him with a letter asking him to 
meet recognised leaders and others tried to garland him. While both the letter 
and the garland had to be left for him at the hotel reception desk (Cape Times 
7 January 1961; New York Times 7 January 1961), there was clearly hope that his 
visit, watched by the world, would allow at least some space for engagement with 
the chief official of the world body.
Though Hammarskjöld began his talks with Verwoerd almost immediately 
after his arrival, he would by then have received an unsigned memorandum 
submitted to him by the ANC and its associated organisations. This argued that 
‘Whereas the unjust nature of South Africa’s form of government was only of 
academic interest in the past, it is now a source of great concern to many nations 
throughout the world. This is because South African tension and violence is 
recognized as a threat to world peace’. The memorandum concluded: ‘Above 
all, we hope that your investigations here will bear out our repeated contention 
that the South African Government is a monster, imposing its arrogant will 
on a dissenting people. We hope that you will recognize, as we do, that this 
Government is holding the vast majority of our people down by sheer force, and 
that its policies are contrary to world practice. We hope, too, that you will inform 
the Security Council that the majority of the South African people are looking to 
that body for substantial assistance in their struggles for the realization of true 
democracy in our country’ (Memorandum 1961). 
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Hammarskjöld’s visit was, for the most part, carefully controlled by the 
government, which of course knew of the appeals for him to meet opposition 
leaders and knew that he would be seen in some quarters in South Africa as 
representing hope for change and an end to apartheid. Though certain events 
were arranged for him in advance, he was able to go where he wished, but a 
heavy security presence followed him, and for the most part he travelled in 
government cars. After his initial talks with Verwoerd, he flew to Cape Town for 
a ‘day off ’ on Sunday 8 January. One of the diplomats in the talks in Pretoria was 
J.F. (Frikkie) Botha, who had represented South Africa at the UN before Fourie 
and so had got to know Hammarskjöld in New York. He had also become a close 
friend of Wieschhoff, to whom he suggested that in Cape Town Hammarskjöld 
should be the guest of Paul Sauer, who after the Sharpeville massacre had 
suggested that the apartheid laws relating to urban Africans might have to be 
reconsidered, and was therefore one of those Afrikaners thought to be ‘verlig’ 
(enlightened). Hammarskjöld was taken by car from his hotel in the Gardens 
to major tourist sites in the city, then to Stellenbosch, Fransch Hoek, where he 
visited the Huguenot Memorial, and Paarl, where he had a meal at the wine 
farm of the chairman of the leading wine cooperative in the region. As they 
looked out over the vineyards, Wieschhoff is said to have remarked to Sauer, 
with a smile: ‘To think that all this must be ruled by the restless natives of the 
Witwatersrand’, and Hammarskjöld to have commented that the Cape was more 
like Europe than Africa (Die Burger 1961; Botha 2011). After his visit to the 
Congo, it certainly must have appeared that way. The Cape Times noted that 
he visited no Cape Town townships and that the only non-white area he passed 
through was the Coloured suburb of Athlone (Cape Times 9 January 1961). 
In the talks in Pretoria (see next section), Verwoerd had tried to justify 
apartheid by reference to the diverse nature of the South African population, 
and Hammarskjöld had asked him in particular where those of mixed descent 
fitted into the apartheid jigsaw (Botha 2011). After his ‘day off ’, he visited the 
Parliament buildings in Cape Town (Parliament itself was not in session) and 
the nearby government offices, where he met members of the Council for 
Coloured Affairs, an unrepresentative state-appointed body. He was greeted 
by people holding up placards, some welcoming him but others calling the 
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Council members stooges. Reg September of the South African Coloured 
People’s Congress tried to present him with a letter critical of the fact that he 
was only meeting those the government wanted him to see. That evening he 
attended a dinner in his honour by the Administrator of Cape Province, Mr 
F.S. Malan, where the cultural historian I.D. du Plessis, an apartheid apologist 
who was then Secretary for Coloured Affairs, tried to persuade him that the 
Coloured people were a distinct group in South African society. He then flew 
to Umtata, the chief city in the Transkei, which he knew was the area at the 
forefront of the implementation of the policy of ‘Grand Apartheid’, and there 
met state-appointed African chiefs who were members of the Transkeian 
Territorial Authority, which had been given some powers of local government. 
These chiefs were headed by Botha Sigcau, who would become the first President 
of the Transkei when that Bantustan was given its nominal ‘independence’ by the 
South African government in October 1976. 
That evening Hans Abraham, the Commissioner-General for the Transkei, hosted 
a dinner for Hammarskjöld, and in his welcoming speech chose to follow the line 
taken by many National Party politicians and launched into a scathing attack on 
the UN, where he said South Africa had been given a rough passage. An annoyed 
Hammarskjöld slipped a note to Brand Fourie saying, ‘How long must I endure 
this, or shall I walk out?’ (Fourie 1991:45). He decided to stay and in his speech 
spoke of the UN as a mirror of the world where global concerns were reflected, 
but he was also reported to have said: ‘I admire the spirit in which you do your 
utmost to help your friends [i.e. the Africans] to achieve the goal which you have 
set yourselves’. This remark led three leaders of the Liberal Party – Alan Paton, 
Jordan Ngubane and Peter Brown – to fire off a telegram to him, expressing 
their ‘great concern’, for they said that such a remark would be taken by many 
South Africans as approving apartheid, and especially the Bantustan dream of 
Verwoerd. ‘The hopes of millions of South Africans whose representatives you 
have not yet met lie in your visit’, Paton told him (Urquhart 1973:499), and 
the chair of the Pretoria branch of the Liberal Party claimed that the trust of 
blacks in the UN had been severely shaken by his comment. Hammarskjöld’s 
staff had then to issue a statement saying he had been misquoted and his speech 
taken out of context, for, they said, as Secretary-General he could make no 
26
Chris Saunders
public pronouncements on South African government policies (Contact 1961; 
Cape Times 12 January 1961). 
Hammarskjöld asked to be driven from Umtata into nearby Pondoland, where 
an uprising the previous year against the imposition of Bantustan policies had 
left over twenty dead. He drove to Lusikisiki in a car with Kaiser Matanzima, 
who would become Transkei’s first Prime Minister twenty-five years later, but 
probably saw no signs of the revolt, which had taken place in mountainous 
country (New York Times 10 January 1961). From Umtata, he flew back to the 
Witwatersrand, by which time the repeated criticism that he was not meeting 
any real leaders of the African people could be ignored no longer. But there 
were problems. Luthuli was restricted to his home town of Groutville in Natal 
Province and it was not practical for Hammarskjöld to go there (on his visit in 
June 1966, Robert Kennedy had the use of a helicopter to take him from Durban 
to see Luthuli), and when Hammarskjöld told Verwoerd on 10 January that he 
wanted to ‘meet true representatives of natives and coloured’, Verwoerd replied, 
‘These people will interpret such interviews as an arbitration by you on UN 
instructions, as an appeal by them to higher authority’, adding, ‘We do not … 
wish you to see representatives of illegal organisations or people under ban for 
political reasons’ (Hammarskjöld Papers).
Clearly Hammarskjöld thought he could not insist on meeting such people, and 
only on his last full day in South Africa did he finally meet three leading Africans 
who had some association with the ANC but were not banned or restricted: K.T. 
Masemola, the Secretary of the Pretoria Native Advisory Board and a director of 
companies, William Nkomo, a medical doctor who had been a founder member 
of the ANC Youth League but was in 1961 distancing himself from his activist 
past, and Alfred B. Xuma, who as President-General of the ANC had been part 
of a successful campaign at the UN in 1946 to block a proposed South African 
annexation of South West Africa, but who had then been ousted as President-
General by the Youth League in 1949 and by 1961 was very much a ‘has-been’. 
The three were hardly, then, the representative leaders that so many had called 
on Hammarskjöld to meet. But in a meeting that lasted 90 minutes, the three 
Africans did tell him that leaders like Luthuli should share in the running of 
the country; that they rejected the division of the country by the creation of 
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Bantustans; and that ‘there might be a case for outside intervention if South 
Africa continued to deny human rights to Africans and other non-whites’ 
(The Star 1961; New York Times 14 January 1961). 
After this meeting Hammarskjöld at last saw a number of African townships. He 
was first driven to Alexandria township, then south to Meadowlands in Soweto. 
Though the convoy in which he travelled mostly sped through the various 
townships in a cloud of dust, he asked to meet some of the inhabitants, and 
visited five homes in Soweto of people who had been forcibly removed some 
years previously from Sophiatown. He was ringed by police as he did so, however, 
and journalists and press photographers were bitter that they could not get near 
him. When he then visited a gold mine he chose not to go down the mine shaft 
but instead to meet two Africans in the mine office, with only Wieschhoff and 
his personal bodyguard, William Ranallo, present. Ephraim Letsoara, the head 
African clerk, and Cornelius Motyeku told reporters afterwards that he had asked 
them if they ever saw political leaders, to which they replied that that was not 
allowed. They also told him that they were well treated, but had to carry passes. 
Before leaving South Africa, he visited another township outside Pretoria, where 
he went into a beerhall and talked to Africans in a butchery, a dry cleaning shop 
and a general store. He had planned to stay two more days, but had to return 
to New York for another Security Council debate on the Congo (Cape Times 
13 January 1961; Urquhart 1973:499). 
The talks
Hammarskjöld interpreted his mandate from the UN as not merely to talk 
about the situation that had given rise to the shootings at Sharpeville and Langa, 
but about apartheid in general. This he approached mostly from a general 
philosophical angle and hardly at all in terms of what it meant for blacks on 
a day-to-day basis. In his talks with Louw in May 1960 he had first sketched 
his views on South Africa’s racial policy. He told Louw that he recognised that 
though ‘both total integration and total and equitable separation may not be 
objectionable policies from the standpoint of human rights, he doubted that, 
having regard to the economical [sic] and demographical situation in the Union, 
policies of complete separation could be regarded as realistic’, and he pointed 
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out that even in what were called ‘European areas’ there would always be a ‘non-
European majority which … would wish to play a full part in Union’s affairs’. 
Louw made the absurd claim that South Africa’s racial policy ‘had been shaped 
in the best interest of the African people’, but did concede that ‘a new approach 
would have to be taken in respect of the…Coloured population’. Hammarskjöld 
ended his discussions with Louw by asking three questions: ‘in the so-called 
Bantu homelands would the people constitutionally be kept to traditional lines 
or be permitted to take up 20th century constitutional forms with a natural share 
in the responsibility for their country’?; ‘how could economic equity be created 
in view of the exorbitant investments necessary’?; and ‘could it be envisaged that 
the native group in the white regions could be barred from rights given to the 
white population?’ (Hammarskjöld Papers). 
Though Hammarskjöld told the Security Council in October 1960 that he 
intended to ‘explore with the Prime Minister the possibility of arrangements 
which would provide for appropriate safeguards of human rights, with adequate 
contact with the United Nations’ (United Nations Security Council 1960), the 
country’s largest newspaper, the Sunday Times, pointed out during his visit that 
Verwoerd had in a sense given his response to Hammarskjöld even before he 
arrived. In his New Year’s broadcast the Prime Minister had said that the UN 
had become ‘a platform where problems are created and aggravated’ and that 
he could not believe that any ‘world organisation…can make any impression on 
our South African thinking or action’, while in another speech he had said that, in 
response to pressure from overseas, South Africa would have to be ‘as unyielding 
as walls of granite’ (Uys 1961). When the two men did finally meet, Verwoerd, 
who could be charming (Kenney 1980), seems to have liked the reserved quiet 
manner of Hammarskjöld, so different from what he saw as the pompous and 
arrogant attitude shown by his visitor of a year earlier, the British Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan. In a break in the talks, Verwoerd said in Afrikaans to Frikkie 
Botha and the few other South Africans present, in language similar to that Mrs 
Thatcher was to use of Gorbachev, that Hammarskjöld was a person he could 
engage with (Botha 2011). 
When his discussions with Verwoerd began at the Prime Minister’s official 
residence in Pretoria on 6 January 1961, Hammarskjöld was told that South 
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Africa was very different from the rest of Africa and that ‘the Western Powers 
should understand what the Union means for the protection of Africa from 
communism and thus for the safety of Europe’. Integration would mean ‘national 
suicide’, said Verwoerd, while separation was ‘a good neighbour policy’ and the 
ultimate goal was ‘a commonwealth of South Africa, including white and black 
states’. In response, Hammarskjöld made the point that ‘the natives have no 
saying [sic] in the central Government and its preparation for the future’. While 
most of the UN would support ‘speedy integration’, he personally was not in 
favour of that, and he realised that it was politically unrealistic, so the question 
was whether there was ‘a competitive alternative’ to integration. In further 
discussions, in another five meetings, Hammarskjöld and Verwoerd explored the 
practicalities of the ‘Bantu homelands’, with Hammarskjöld pointing out that 
they would require major investment and much more land to become viable, 
and he failed to see the likelihood of that. He told Verwoerd that he did not 
understand South Africa’s racial policy outside the ‘homelands’, and that much 
of the country’s legislation left him ‘frankly shocked’. Racial discrimination ‘is 
bound to cast doubt of [sic] the so-to-say rational arguments for segregation’. 
He pointed out that South Africa had not explained its approach to the world ‘in 
terms which convinced public opinion’, and that the present slow progress to the 
government’s self-imposed targets would not work. The African states at the UN 
would unite on the South African issue. A much bolder approach might ‘catch 
the wind’ (did he think here of Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’?), but was urgent. 
It would mean setting aside ‘a sufficient and coherent territory to serve as a basis 
for the national life of a Bantu state’, and ‘fixed steps at short intervals leading to 
the establishment of such political institutions as were necessary as a basis for 
full independence and self-government’. Africans outside the ‘homelands’ must 
have their ‘human rights’ recognised. He suggested that it might be useful for the 
government to set up an institution to receive complaints and draw attention 
to deviations from the sound way to reach the target, as well as to maintain 
contact with the UN. In response Verwoerd said that his government would ‘try 
to increase the pace but it is very difficult’; ‘in the meantime we have to maintain 
the political control in our own hands. Otherwise the natives, with the help of 
international force, will overwhelm us’ (Hammarskjöld Papers).
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Though the status of South West Africa did come up (Botha 2011), 
Hammarskjöld had no mandate to raise that issue, and it was not pursued. At 
the heart of the discussions, then, was Verwoerd’s concept of so-called ‘grand 
apartheid’ (to distinguish it from the ‘petty apartheid’ of racial discrimination 
similar to that of the United States South earlier in the century) or ‘separate 
development’, which, as he had explained to Macmillan a year earlier, was his 
answer to the African nationalism then sweeping the continent. As we have 
seen, Hammarskjöld did not reject out of hand the idea of developing the 
African reserve areas into self-governing and then ‘independent’ territories, 
but he explored with Verwoerd what might be done to make this meaningful, 
and insisted that any such policy should be discussed with those it affected. 
He knew, of course, that Verwoerd had made clear there would be no change 
to apartheid per se, and he tried to raise issues of human rights, which 
Verwoerd deflected by discussions of South Africa’s historical legacy and its 
diverse population, which he said required policies of separation. Though 
there was no agreement between the two men, Hammarskjöld did not see 
this as meaning the engagement could not continue, and both men envisaged 
that their exchanges would continue at some future date. So Hammarskjöld 
reported to the Security Council on 23 January 1961 that while ‘so far no 
mutually acceptable arrangement has been found’, ‘this lack of agreement is 
not conclusive’ and that the ‘exchange of views in general has served a most 
useful purpose. The Secretary-General does not consider the consultations 
as having come to an end, and he looks forward to their continuation at 
an appropriate time with a view to further efforts from his side to find an 
adequate solution….The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa has 
indicated that further consideration will be given to questions raised in the 
course of the talks and has stated that “the Union Government, having found 
the talks with the Secretary-General useful and constructive, have [sic]decided 
to invite him at an appropriate time, or times, to visit the Union again in order 
that the present contact may be continued”’ (United Nations Security Council 
1961:S/4635). 
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Assessment
Soon after Hammarskjöld’s visit relations between the South African government 
and the UN deteriorated again when the UN’s commission on South Africa 
threatened to visit without visas, but when Hammarskjöld died in September 
most commentators in South Africa praised him for his quiet diplomacy and 
integrity. For Hammarskjöld the visit to South Africa, for all its difficulties, 
must have been a relatively pleasant distraction from the Congo, where he was 
involved in what he himself called ‘the craziest operation in history’ (Henderson 
1969:80). There were numerous demands on him on what was a very short visit, 
some of them absurd. The South African Tennis Board, for example, wanted 
him to investigate colour discrimination in sport (Cape Times 9 January 1961). 
His main task was to talk to a government pursuing policies with which he 
fundamentally disagreed, but, as we have seen, he made some efforts to speak to 
others. The delay of over six months for his arrival was, from the point of view 
of any action being taken against the apartheid regime, unfortunate, though by 
the time it did take place another seventeen African countries had joined the UN 
and they would add voice to the campaign against apartheid. Hammarskjöld’s 
initiative was not continued, for the next Secretaries-General to visit were Kurt 
Waldheim in 1972 and Pérez de Cuéllar in 1982, and their visits were mainly 
focused on the South West Africa/Namibia issue. 
Could Hammarskjöld have done more? He was in South Africa as a guest of the 
South African government and he knew he had to be seen as an impartial UN 
person. The arrangements for his visit, as the Cape Times said, were ‘calculated 
to frustrate those who had planned demonstrations and hoped for meetings to 
show him another sides of the picture’ (Cape Times 12 January 1961), but as the 
newspaper pointed out, he could have stayed in his hotel room and chose not 
to. The Cape Times believed that the government had received bad publicity 
from the impression that was created that it was protecting him from anti-
government influences. It would have been better, the Cape Times suggested, 
had the government made clear to the public at the beginning of his visit that he 
was free to see anyone he wanted to see (Cape Times, editorial, 13 January 1961).
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Had Hammarskjöld lived and made further visits, it seems unlikely that he could 
either have become a strong voice against apartheid or have persuaded Verwoerd 
to modify his Bantustan policies. At the first press conference he had held after 
the Security Council resolution of April 1960, Hammarskjöld had asked: ‘How 
do you go about building bridges? The building of a firm bridge, of course, over 
which you can pass without any difficulties, may be a long story, but you can at 
least put the first stones down into the water or get a first piece of wood across 
the water, a little bit out into it’ (Hammarskjöldblog.com). The South African 
government expected him to return and wanted to continue the dialogue with 
him, but in the event his visit led nowhere and the impetus for further action 
in the Security Council was lost. But Peter Brown, the National Chairman of 
the Liberal Party, though disappointed in his visit, thought that it might have 
positive results. If Verwoerd was deaf to Hammarskjöld’s arguments, wrote 
Brown, ‘the United Nations and the Commonwealth will know that argument is 
useless and will think more in terms of action … it would be idle to suppose that 
the rest of the world will sit back and let apartheid flourish [or] that any state 
can survive in isolation in the Atomic Age’ (Brown 1961). And Hammarskjöld’s 
failure to achieve anything substantial in his talks with Verwoerd did feed into 
South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth two months after his visit. 
After the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference the previous year Kwame 
Nkrumah had told a branch of the UN Organisation that ‘If the Secretary-
General is unable to agree with the Government of the Union of South Africa 
on such arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes 
and principles of the Charter, then the Government of Ghana for one would 
find it embarrassing to remain in the Commonwealth with a republic whose 
policy is not based upon the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ 
(Hammarskjöld Papers). 
Though Hammarskjöld’s successors were to take up the South West Africa/
Namibia issue, and the Security Council was to impose a voluntary arms 
embargo in 1963 and then a mandatory embargo in 1977, the UN was never 
to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. On the other hand, the 
mounting campaign against South Africa at the UN was one aspect of the 
growing international pressure against apartheid that finally helped bring that 
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racial system to an end. Hammarskjöld’s interaction with South Africa was a 
brief moment in a much longer story (Reddy 2008). It is certainly the case that 
on South Africa and South West Africa he achieved nothing significant, for 
apartheid intensified and repression and conflict in both countries grew worse. 
There was none of the ‘substantial progress’ he had hoped for, however modest. 
Anti-apartheid activists were naturally disappointed in this, but in the context 
of the time it may be argued that it was not possible for him to have done more 
than he did.
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